Securing ad hoc networks represents a challenging issue, related to their very characteristics of decentralized architecture, low-complexity, and multiple hops communications. Even if several methods are available, this paper presents a novel approach to allow secret sharing of information at lower levels of the node protocol stack. In fact, secret sharing schemes provide a natural way of addressing security issues in ad hoc networks. To this aim, a flexible framework for secure end-to-end transmission of confidential information is proposed which exploits multipath source routing and hierarchical shares distribution. Such a goal is achieved by designing an ideal, perfect, and eventually verifiable secret sharing scheme based on Birkhoff polynomial interpolation and by establishing suitable hierarchies among independent paths.
data secret is to encrypt the data with a secret key known also by the receiver, ensuring in this way confidentiality.
As already said, the general energy contraint in these networks creates limits also for security, due to consumption of processor power. Moreover, in asymmetric cryptographic algorithms (used for example in Encapsulating Security Payload to provide confidentiality in IPSec ( [1] )) the length of keys which provide security is often too high for node's working memory. To achieve confidentiality means to prevent intermediate or non-trusted nodes from understanding the contents of packets. A lot of protocols offer solutions using cryptographic algorithms (see [2] , [3] , [4] ).
The idea of the paper is to exploit the specific characteristics of an ad hoc network (multihop data delivery, absence of fixed infrastructure, decentralized architecture) in order to enforce security at the lower levels of the protocol stack (i.e., MAC layer). In particular, we propose a method to achieve end-to-end data protection against passive attacks in ad hoc networks where the nodes are not highly mobile. We focus on a method which permits to achieve confidentiality exploiting multiple paths between source and destination and taking into account different characteristics of the paths. As a consequence, the next paragraphs are focused on secret sharing schemes. A method which exploits multiple paths avoiding message retransmission is to transmit redundant information through additional routes for error detection and correction [5] : part of the disjoint routes are used to transmit data and part for redundant information. In such a way if certain routes are compromised, the receiver is able to recover the message. In our method the transmission exploits multiple paths but improving the concept of redundant information.
In the previous example confidentiality can be achieved only by adding encryption. We pretend to avoid the use of cryptographic algorithms for the already mentioned reasons. The key point of our scheme is that a non-trusted node intercepting a packet gets no information about the transmitted data. This is achieved with a secret sharing scheme. In [5] , the usage of threshold schemes for key management is proposed. The same principle together with multipath routing is exploited, also in the case of data transmission, in [6] from subtler properties of Birkhoff polynomial interpolation.
In order to exploit different characteristics of paths and in particular different trust levels, it is natural to apply a hierarchical model. For instance, the protocol SAR (Security Aware Ad Hoc Routing) proposes the Quality of Protection bit vector to classify routes [3] . Even though a hierarchical secret sharing scheme seems to be suitable also for an ad hoc network, nevertheless the previous approaches suffer from severe constraints for practical implementation. Namely, efficiency of Shamir's proposal is compromised by the systematical delay due to multiple assignments. On the other hand, Tassa's algorithm works only on large finite fields (see [8] , Theorem 4), making it unsuitable for an ad hoc node with limited computational resources.
In order to overcome such difficulties, the present paper introduces an alternative scheme for secure information sharing in ad hoc networks applications. As in Tassa's approach, Birkhoff interpolation theory is applied, but with some crucial improvements. In particular, random allocation of participants enables to exploit stronger mathematical tools and drastically reduce the size of the base field. Furthermore, each participant receives only one share (overcoming the main drawback of Shamir's hierarchical scheme) and the secret is identified with a sequence of elements of the field (reflecting the natural structure of a message as a sequence of packets). As a consequence, both the delay and the overhead are significantly reduced.
The structure of the paper is the following. In Section II, after recalling the definition of hierarchical secret sharing, the proposed sharing scheme is introduced and a mathematical proof that it is ideal, perfect, and eventually verifiable is given. In Sections III and IV, a hierarchical multipath framework for ad hoc networks is described, providing both a general scheme and a sample application scenario. Finally, in Section V, some concluding remarks and outlines about future work on the topic are presented.
II. DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED ALGORITHM
The basic scheme proposed by Shamir [7] relies on standard Lagrange polynomial interpolation. To be explicit, 
In order to reconstruct the secret, a subset of participants with associated real numbers
, with
, has to solve the following linear system: As pointed out by Shamir himself in [7] , a hierarchical variant can be introduced by simply assigning a higher number of shares to higher level participants. More recently, a refined hierarchical scheme was obtained by Tassa [8] 
is a strictly increasing sequence of integers, then a , and
, and so on.
In order to construct a suitable
hierarchical threshold secret sharing scheme, it is natural to apply
Birkhoff interpolation instead of Lagrange interpolation. The key point is that the Birkhoff scheme involves not only a polynomial, but also its (higher order) derivatives. To be formal, as in [11] , p. 124, let
, be an
interpolation matrix, whose elements are zeros or ones, with exactly
, be a set of (see for instance p. 126 of [11] ).
The idea now is to exploit this necessary condition in order to ensure that only authorized subsets can reconstruct the secret. Intuitively speaking, an evaluation of the polynomial itself carries more informations than an evaluation of any of its derivatives since it involves more coefficients; therefore it sounds reasonable to assign to a participant of higher level the evaluation of a lower order derivative.
For shares generation, we propose the following algorithm:
1) Select a finite field We stress that for R s our scheme is ideal, i.e. the size of the shares is equal to the size of the secret; if
the information rate is even higher. We also point out that the above scheme becomes verifiable after the following additional procedure, inspired by [9] . 
In order to reconstruct the secret , the combiner has to solve the following linear system:
This amounts to the Birkhoff interpolation problem with associated interpolation matrix 
III. HIERARCHICAL SECRET SHARING IN AD HOC NETWORKS
In an ad hoc network end-to-end security is a major issue. Indeed, we can assume that neighboring nodes can easily exchange security keys, in order to establish an authenticated and secure channel on a link basis (a usual assumption in this situation, see for instance [14] and [6] ). Therefore, the problem to solve is related to grant secure transmissions on an end-to-end basis. Our approach aims at exploiting multiple independent paths from source to destination in such a way to spread along the ad hoc network the secret information. Depending on various factors, paths can be classified into several levels and identifying a suitable hierarchy of disjoint routes allows to apply the hierarchical secret sharing scheme presented in Section II in order to enforce security. However, the selection of a path hierarchy is a non trivial task in an ad hoc network. In the next paragraphs a general model is proposed, which is based on both global and local properties of the paths.
Let us identify a path from a source (dealer) ; two paths
. As it is well known, the problem of finding a maximum cardinality set of node disjoint paths in a network (thought as a digraph) can be solved in polynomial time (see for instance [13] , Proposition 2.4 (i)). Choose a maximum cardinality set W of independent paths (or more generally any sufficiently big subset) and fix
We can assume that neighboring nodes can easily exchange security keys, in order to establish an authenticated and secure channel on a link basis (a usual assumption in this situation, see for instance [14] and [6] ). Therefore, the problem to solve is related to grant secure transmissions on an end-to-end basis.
x § be the packet loss probability of the path x. Its value depends on several properties of the path (for instance, signal-to-noise ratio, number of hops, interference, etc.).
It is possible to define ¥ § ¤ © x § as the probability for a packet travelling on x to be eavesdropped. or less. More precisely, we define: [14] , [6] , it is possible to assume that neighbouring nodes in an ad hoc network can exchange encryption keys during link initialization in order to establish an authenticated channel on the physical link). example sensors disseminated in a terrain which need to communicate protecting data. In this situation, the problem of finding independent paths between a pair of nodes has been addressed in several papers. In [6] a modified Dijkstra algorithm is used; however, this solution assumes the knowledge of the graph associated with the network, which is not always available in such a network. Different approaches are proposed, like [15] (Selective Broadcast) and into levels as follows:
¥ is the probability for each node to be active, it is natural to set the packet loss probability increasing with the number of hops:
In order to implement the proposed scheme, we introduce the integer:
and we define a hierarchical structure based on length of paths: , but the proposed scheme gives the freedom to establish the path hierarchy according to different parameters (for instance, high priority could be granted to paths with high performance: high signal-to-noise ratio, low delay,...), as well as a combination of the above.
In Figure 3 we report a set of by applying (5). The path hierarchy is now completely determined (see Table I ).
In order to quantify the security enforcement produced by our hierarchical approach, we compare the probabilities of reconstructing the secret after capturing 
